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SARBANES-OXLEY AND ALASKA
NATIVE CORPORATIONS: DO THE
REGULATIONS APPLY?
S. MIKE MURPHY*
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a wide-reaching securities
regulatory reform effort aimed at protecting shareholders and
increasing corporate managerial accountability.
This Note
assesses the impact of the new regulations on Alaska Native
Corporations. After establishing that Native Corporations are
largely exempt from most of the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, this Note argues, nevertheless, that it would be
prudent and consistent with the founding purposes of Native
Corporations to adjust their internal best practice to mirror the
requirements of the Act.

I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska Native Corporations (“ANCs”) are complicated
entities.
ANCs exist in a regulatory world of exceptions,
exemptions, and special rules and regulations designed to help
them achieve their intended purpose: helping Alaska Natives. The
unique framework of federal and state rules that govern ANCs
benefits those organizations and, in turn, improves the welfare of
Alaska Natives and enhances the Alaskan economy. What
happens, however, when a set of broad, new federal securities
1
regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”),
interacts with the more specific regulatory regime applicable to
ANCs? This Note addresses that question.
This analysis will begin with a general background of ANCs
and some of the characteristics that make them different from
other corporations. It will then undertake a detailed examination
of SOX, apply the Act’s provisions to ANCs, and ultimately
determine that SOX has only a negligible impact on the
Copyright © 2006 by S. Mike Murphy.
* The author would like to give special thanks to Professor James D. Cox,
Jessica Graham, and Walter Featherly.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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governance and regulation of ANCs. Next, this Note will analyze
the interaction between SOX and the provisions of the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act that bring ANCs within the scope of
some securities regulations. The analysis will conclude that ANCs
still largely avoid the impact of SOX and the protections that
Congress intended the Act to provide to shareholders.
Once SOX’s impact is established, this Note will analyze
whether the end result is good for ANCs. This inquiry will
examine policy issues, congressional intent, and the historical
record of foul play by ANCs to conclude that the goals of ANCs
would be better met if they were subject to the provisions of SOX.
Finally, the analysis concludes with recommendations for
incorporating the requirements of SOX into ANCs’ “best
practices.”
II. BACKGROUND
In 1971 Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims
2
Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) to address longstanding land disputes
between Alaska Natives and the U.S. government as well as
intense oil speculation that accompanied the operation of multiple
3
profitable oil fields in Alaska. Because of these conditions,
Congress found “an immediate need” for the settlement of Alaska
Native claims of land ownership in the state, and ANCSA was
4
Congress’s solution.
5
ANCSA addresses the formation of ANCs. These native
6
corporations distribute the benefits of ANCSA to Alaska Natives.
7
They own land and operate for the benefit of Alaska Natives, and
some have evolved into sophisticated, multinational organizations
8
Just like ordinary
with multimillion dollar annual revenues.
corporations, profits from ANCs may be distributed to
9
shareholders in the form of dividends. In addition to dividends,
ANCs provide jobs and the benefits of economic development to
Alaska Natives.
2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629 (2000).
3. DONALD CRAIG MITCHELL, TAKE MY LAND, TAKE MY LIFE 2–10 (2001).
4. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
5. See §§ 1606–1607 (creating two classes of native corporations: regional
corporations and village corporations).
6. § 1606(j).
7. § 1606(d).
8. See Cook Inlet Tribal Council, Inc. Annual Report, 2004 Annual Report,
http://www.citci.com/ (follow “Annual Reports” hyperlink; then follow “2003-2004
Annual Report” hyperlink).
9. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(1)(C).
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The drafters of ANCSA set forth rules that govern the
financial operations of ANCs in the text of the statute.10 State
statutes followed, which helped clarify the financial duties of the
11
However, in their hurry to settle land
directors of ANCs.
disputes, neither the drafters of ANCSA nor state lawmakers
anticipated the possible effects of wide-reaching federal regulations
that had yet to be enacted. One such regulation is SOX, which
Congress appears to have intended to apply somewhat broadly to
publicly held entities.
Unfortunately, directors and general
counsels of ANCs are unsure of exactly how SOX, a monumental
act, affects ANCs. The costs of SOX compliance are high, but the
fines and criminal penalties for violating the Act make ignoring it a
12
very risky prospect.
This Note will address the applicability of SOX to ANCs. It
will first examine whether part or all of SOX applies to ANCs.
This analysis will begin with the text of SOX. It will next analyze
the legislative history of SOX in order to gain insight into the
legislative intent of the Act as it relates to ANCs. Finally, this
article will examine how the enactment of SOX should change the
“best practices” of ANCs.
It should be cautioned that many ANCs operate largely
13
through subsidiaries that do not themselves qualify as ANCs.
This Note addresses only the applicability of SOX to the ANCs
themselves, not their subsidiaries.
III. THE NATURE OF THE ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATION
The ANC is a vehicle used to transfer benefits of the ANCSA
to Alaska Natives. For administrative purposes, ANCSA divided
14
Alaskan land and Alaska Natives into twelve geographic regions.
A thirteenth “region” was added for Alaska Natives who do not
15
Each of these regions was
reside in the state of Alaska.
16
incorporated into a for-profit corporation under Alaska state law.
10. E.g., § 1606.
11. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.06.433, .960, .961 (2004).
12. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. III 2003) (fine, twenty years
imprisonment, or both).
13. For example, Calista Corporation performs much of its business through
its five major subsidiaries: Tunista, Inc., Yulista Management Services Inc.,
Chiulista Camp Services, Inc., Ookichista Drilling Services, Inc., and Ilikista
Ventures, Inc. See Subsidiary Companies, http://www.calistacorp.com/busent.html
(last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
14. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a).
15. § 1606(c).
16. See § 1606(d).
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These corporations have boards of directors, bylaws, managers,
and stockholders, much like any typical public corporation.17
However, ANCs are atypical in some critical ways. The differences
are particularly important when it comes to the specific properties
of the stocks they issue and their status with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
A. ANC Stock
Initially, original ANC stock (known as “Settlement Common
Stock”) was distributed by each regional corporation to every
18
Alaska Native who was a member of that region. One hundred
shares of Settlement Common Stock was given to each enrolled
19
Alaska Native. Each share carries with it all the rights carried by
any normal share distributed by an Alaska corporation, such as the
20
right to vote for directors. ANCs are authorized to issue more
stock in accordance with their articles of incorporation. The initial
issuance of Settlement Common Stock was given equally to every
Alaska Native individual who lived in the region of each
21
corporation.
Settlement Common Stock is unique in that it initially could
not be sold or “otherwise alienated” except in some narrow
22
circumstances, and then only to another Alaska Native or a
23
descendant of a Native. However, there is an opt-out provision
that became effective on December 18, 1991, that allows ANCs to
amend their articles of incorporation in order to end all alienability
24
If an ANC chooses this route, all of its original
restrictions.
Settlement Common Stock would be canceled, and new

17. § 1606(f).
18. See § 1606(g)(1)(A).
19. Id.
20. § 1606(h)(1).
21. § 1606(g)(2).
22. § 1606(h)(1)(B)–(C). Examples of when Settlement Common Stock can
be transferred include inter vivos gifts to one’s children and transfers pursuant to a
court decree of separation, divorce, or child support. However, in these situations,
the recipient must be an Alaska Native or a descendent of a Native. §
1606(h)(1)(C). Settlement Common Stock can also be transferred through
inheritance “in accordance with the lawful will of such holder or pursuant to
applicable laws of intestate succession.” § 1606(h)(2)(A). Regional corporations
may nevertheless have the right to purchase, at fair market value, transfers made
pursuant to applicable laws of intestate succession to a person not a Native or a
descendent of a Native. § 1606(h)(2)(B).
23. § 1606(h)(1)(C).
24. § 1629c(b).
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“Replacement Common Stock” would be issued in its place.25 In
the event that a Settlement Common Stockholder fails to exchange
original Settlement Common Stock with Replacement Common
Stock, ANCs would have a right to repurchase the Settlement
26
Common Stock for “fair value.”
B. ANCs and the SEC
At their formation, ANCs were exempt from the jurisdiction
27
of the SEC. Specifically, they were statutorily exempted from
“the provisions, as amended, of the Investment Company Act of
1940, . . . the Securities Act of 1933, . . . and the Securities
28
Exchange Act of 1934.” However, this exception is not absolute.
It lasts only until any of three events occurs: (i) the ANC issues
stock of any type besides Settlement Common Stock, where this
new stock is issued to anyone besides Alaska Natives who were
eligible for Settlement Common Stock or to an entity that does not
exist solely for the benefit of Alaska Natives, provided that the new
29
stock is not an exempt security pursuant to SEC rules; (ii) the
ANC terminates the alienability restrictions on its outstanding
30
Settlement Common Stock; or (iii) the ANC registers with the
31
SEC. The occurrence of any of these three events eliminates an
ANC’s jurisdictional immunity from the provisions and
32
requirements of the SEC.
C. The Issue of Who is an “Issuer”
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of determining whether specific
provisions of SOX apply to ANCs is the definition of the word
33
34
“issuer” under SOX. Many provisions of SOX dealing with the
35
operations of businesses apply only to issuers. The term issuer as
used here is distinguished from the ordinary usage of the word,
which refers to any company that issues securities. Under SOX, a
corporation is an issuer if: (i) it has securities registered under
25. § 1606(h)(3).
26. § 1606(h)(2)(B).
27. § 1625.
28. § 1625(a).
29. § 1625(a)(1).
30. § 1625(a)(2).
31. § 1625(a)(3).
32. § 1625(b).
33. An issuer is basically an SEC reporting company, but this paper will follow
the convention set in the definition in SOX.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 7201(7) (Supp. IV 2006).
35. See, e.g., § 78m (Supp. III 2003) (dealing with corporate responsibility).
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section 12 of that Securities Exchange Act; (ii) it is required to file
reports under section 15(d) of 15 U.S.C. 78o(d); or (iii) it has filed a
registration statement with the SEC, even if that registration has
not become effective where the company has not withdrawn the
36
ANCs may qualify as issuers under any of these
registration.
three tests.
Determination of whether an ANC is an issuer under the first
37
test involves a two-prong analysis. ANCs must first meet the
definition of issuer under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and,
second, they must be required to register under section 12 of that
act, which provides:
[A]ny person who issues or proposes to issue any security;
except that with respect to certificates of deposit for securities,
voting-trust certificates, or collateral-trust certificates, or with
respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated
investment trust not having a board of directors or of the fixed,
restricted management, or unit type, the term “issuer” means the
person or persons performing the acts and assuming the duties of
depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or
other agreement or instrument under which such securities are
issued; and except that with respect to equipment-trust
certificates or like securities, the term “issuer” means the person
38
by whom the equipment or property is, or is to be, used.

ANCs fall within this definition because they issue securities and
39
they are, in fact, required to issue Settlement Common Stock.
While such stock is not ordinarily a security, it does not fall under
any of the exceptions in the statute.
Further, under the two-prong test, a corporation’s securities
must also be registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act, which provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any member,
broker, or dealer to effect any transaction in any security (other
than an exempted security) on a national securities exchange unless
a registration is effective as to such security for such
40
exchange . . . .” ANCs are all initially exempted securities under
ANCSA, so this section does not apply. Even if an ANC were to
lose its exemption, it would still not be bound to register unless it
41
had assets in excess of $1,000,000 and 500 or more shareholders,

36. § 7201(7).
37. See id.
38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2000). In this
section, the term “person” means “a natural person, company, government, or
political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government.” § 78c(a)(9).
39. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g) (2000).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2000).
41. § 78l(g)(1)(A).
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or if it wanted to trade its stock on a national stock exchange.42
However, if an ANC were to either voluntarily register its
securities or be forced to register in order to have its stock traded
on a national exchange, it would be an issuer for the purposes of
SOX.
The second way by which an ANC may be classified as an
issuer is if it is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the
43
Securities Exchange Act. That section requires that:
Each issuer which has filed a registration statement containing
an undertaking which is or becomes operative under this
subsection as in effect prior to Aug. 20, 1964, [the date of
enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,] and
each issuer which shall after such date file a registration
statement which has become effective pursuant to the Securities
Act of 1933, as amended, shall file with the Commission, in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors, such supplementary and
periodic information, documents, and reports as may be required
pursuant to section 78m of this title in respect
of a security
44
registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.

In sum, an issuer who has registered with the SEC must file
45
As
periodic reports containing certain financial information.
discussed previously, ANCs are, at the outset, exempted from SEC
46
filings and registrations. However, there is nothing preventing an
ANC from registering with the SEC. In fact, this contingency is
47
specifically provided for in the securities law exemption. If an
ANC wishes to issue securities other than Settlement Common
Stock, however, that ANC would lose its SEC exemption and then
48
would have to register like any other publicly traded company.
Again, unless an ANC loses its SEC exemption, it is exempt
because it is not an issuer.
The third way by which an ANC would qualify as an issuer
under SOX would be to file a registration statement with the SEC,
even if that registration has not become effective, as long as the
49
company has not withdrawn the registration. The analysis here

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
SEC).
48.
49.

§ 78l(a).
§ 7201(7).
§ 78o(d).
See id.
43 U.S.C. § 1625(a).
See § 1625(a)(3) (permitting ANCs to file a registration statement with the
§ 1625(a)(1).
See 15 U.S.C. § 7201(7).
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mirrors that of the second test. An ANC does not have to register
unless it wants to broaden the types of securities it can issue, but it
50
may choose to register for any reason at all. Under this third
approach, any ANC that has registered, for any reason, would be
51
an issuer for purposes of SOX. While an ANC may choose to
pursue strategies that make it an issuer, no ANC has yet issued
securities other than Settlement Common Stock, or voluntarily
registered with the SEC. While this does not mean that no ANC
will become an issuer in the future, it does mean that currently no
ANC is subject to those sections of SOX that apply only to issuers.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF SOX TO ANCS
A. Jurisdiction of SOX
The first task necessary to establish whether and to what
degree ANCs must comply with SOX is to determine which
sections of SOX are applicable to corporations and corporate
officers, as opposed to accountants, accounting firms, investment
brokers, and investment rating agencies.
SOX is divided into eleven titles, each of which is applicable to
specific parties. This section of the Note will give an overview of
each of the titles, and the following section will provide a closer
analysis to sections that are of particular concern to ANCs. Most
titles do not directly affect ANCs, and those readers who are
already familiar with the general structure and content of SOX
may find the following analysis unnecessary for understanding the
conclusions and recommendations of this Note.
Title I establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight
52
53
This section outlines the organization of the Board,
Board.
54
requires that public accounting firms register with the Board, and
grants the Board authority to establish rules regarding
55
56
accountants. It further describes the duties of the Board and
57
establishes how the Board will be funded. Title I also establishes

50. See 43 U.S.C. § 1625(a).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 7201(7).
52. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. I (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§
7211–7219).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. III 2003).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 7212 (Supp. III 2003).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 7231 (Supp. III 2003) (“The Board may. . .exempt
any. . .accounting firm. . . .”).
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7214–15 (Supp. III 2003).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 7219 (Supp. III 2003).
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the application of SOX to foreign accounting firms58 and how the
59
Board is to recognize generally accepted accounting standards.
Thus, Title I deals with the establishment of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board and regulation and
60
registration of accounting firms. To the extent that ANCs may
use public accounting firms, this title may be relevant. However,
Title I will not directly impact the internal business of ANCs,
though certain standards may apply to its outside accountants.
61
It governs the
Title II regulates auditor independence.
62
relationship between auditors and public companies. Specifically,
it establishes that the non-auditing services an accounting firm can
63
provide to its auditing clients are very limited. Title II also limits
the amount of time that a lead accounting partner can provide
continuous service to the same public company, and provides
various other regulations directed toward limiting the relationship
64
between corporations and auditing accountants. Like Title I, this
title may affect ANCs dealings with accounting firms, but Title II is
primarily directed at accounting firm relationships with entities
that are categorized as reporting companies. Accordingly, Title II
will not have a major direct impact on ANCs since they are not
reporting companies.
Title III, in contrast, deals directly with “corporate
65
responsibility.” It details the role of corporations in congressional
66
efforts to regulate public disclosures of financial information.
This theme is continued in Title IV, which requires enhanced
67
financial disclosures from corporations. Titles III and IV apply
directly to the internal functions and public disclosures of

58. 15 U.S.C. § 7216 (Supp. III 2003).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 7218 (Supp. III 2003).
60. §§ 7211–19.
61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. II (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
62. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (Supp. III 2003) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for a
registered public accounting firm . . . to provide to that issuer” certain enumerated
services.).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. III (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 and 29 U.S.C.).
66. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 78m(2) (“The audit committee of each issuer . . . shall be
directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work
of any registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer . . . .”).
67. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. IV (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. ).
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corporations. Their effect on ANCs will be closely examined later
in this Note.
68
Title V is concerned with the regulation of securities analysts.
It addresses the problems that can stem from securities analysts’
power to manipulate securities prices through their
69
recommendations. It includes a series of rules aimed at reducing
the likelihood that analysts’ recommendations will be designed to
70
affect the market instead of providing objective information.
Title V, therefore, will not directly affect the internal operations of
ANCs.
Title VI defines changes to the SEC’s authority under SOX
71
provisions. It gives the SEC authority to deny any person the
ability to practice before the SEC if that person has acted
72
It empowers federal courts and the SEC to
unprofessionally.
73
prevent a person from offering penny stocks and to prevent
74
people from being “associated” with a security dealer or broker.
It also amends the Securities Exchange Act in several ways to give
the SEC more power to regulate people who work in the securities
75
industry. Because this title is primarily directed at those people
who professionally trade securities, it is unlikely to substantially
affect ANCs.
Title VII calls for studies and reports to be conducted dealing
with various aspects of accounting firms, credit rating agencies,
investment banks, and the enforcement actions that currently affect
76
those entities. Because ANCs are not classified as any of these
types of organizations, this section of SOX is unlikely to have any
effect on ANCs.
In contrast, Title VIII is applicable to corporate officers and
77
stiffens penalties for those who commit corporate criminal fraud.
This section is directed toward those people who take actions to
78
mislead the public about a company’s financial condition. It is not

68. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. V, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-6, u-2 (Supp. III 2003).
69. 15 U.S.C. §78o-6.
70. Id.
71. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. VI (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3(a).
73. §§ 77t(g), 78u(a)(6).
74. § 78o.
75. § 78o-6.
76. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. VII.
77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. VIII (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
78. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519–20.
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limited to executives of issuers or those within reporting
companies. It affects all people, but especially corporate officers,
including executives of ANCs.
Title IX is similar to Title VIII, except that it is broader and
79
deals with white-collar crime. Specifically, it includes provisions
80
regarding attempt and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and
81
mail and wire fraud, establishes criminal penalties for failing to
82
fully report corporate financial information, and includes general
83
This title is not
sentencing guidelines on white-collar crimes.
limited to issuers or reporting companies and is applicable to
anyone in a position to commit white-collar crimes, including
directors and employees of ANCs.
Title X is a very short section simply stating that the United
States Senate believes that a federal tax return from a corporation
84
should be signed by the chief executive officer of the corporation.
While this provision may seem trivial, it nonetheless concerns
businesses and, accordingly, is a provision that may be applicable
to ANCs.
Title XI is another provision that deals with accountability for
85
86
corporate fraud. It defines penalties for tampering with records,
confers upon the SEC authority to temporarily freeze a company’s
87
activities while an investigation is pending, and prevents people
who have violated securities laws from serving as officers or
88
directors of companies. It also requests that the federal criminal
89
sentencing guidelines be amended and adds a section to the
criminal section of the U.S. Code that punishes retaliation against
90
corporate informants. The effects of these provisions are not
limited to officers of issuers or reporting companies, so they have
the potential to affect ANCs and their officers.

79. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. IX (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. ).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. III 2003).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. III 2003).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. III 2003).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Supp. III 2003).
84. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. X.
85. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. XI (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 and 28 U.S.C.)..
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)(3) (Supp. III 2003).
88. § 78u-3(f).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 994.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1513.
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In sum, six of the eleven titles that comprise SOX encompass
areas that may affect ANCs and their directors. These are (i) Title
III, Corporate Responsibility; (ii) Title IV, Enhanced Financial
Disclosures; (iii) Title VIII, Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability; (iv) Title IX, White-Collar Crime Penalty
Enhancements; (v) Title X, Corporate Tax Returns; and (vi) Title
XI, Corporate Fraud Accountability. Each of these titles has
unique jurisdictional properties which will be examined separately.
B. Specific SOX Titles and Their Applicability to ANCs
1. Title III: Corporate Responsibility. Title III creates several
reporting responsibilities for companies. Whether or not ANCs
are affected depends on the threshold determination of whether an
ANC is an issuer. Those ANCs that are—or that wish to become—
issuers would have several duties under Title III.
First, any ANC which is an issuer must establish an audit
committee to oversee the work of any public accounting firm that is
91
employed by the ANC. This committee is made of members of
the board of directors of the company but must “otherwise be
92
The standard for
independent” of the corporation.
“independent” focuses primarily on economic and personal
relationships between the audit committee member and the
93
issuer.
Second, ANCs that file SEC reports must have those reports
certified as accurate by the “principal executive officer or officers,
94
and the principal financial officer and officers.” This provision
will, of course, not apply to ANCs that do not have to file SEC
reports. Any ANCs that do file SEC reports, whether voluntarily
or because they have lost their SEC immunity, will have to comply
with this section.
Third, the section of the corporate responsibility obligations
under SOX prohibits an issuer from exerting undue influence on
95
auditors. Again, this will only affect ANCs who have become
issuers. Fourth, issuers must refrain from acting to coerce, mislead,
96
or otherwise manipulate auditors. Fifth, CEOs and CFOs must
use their bonuses to reimburse an issuer in the event that

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
§ 78j-1(m)(3).
See § 78j-1(m)(3)(B).
15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (Supp. III 2003).
§ 7242.
§ 7242(a).
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misconduct by a CEO or CFO requires that issuer to prepare an
accounting restatement.97
Sixth, a major section of Title III is devoted to requiring that
directors and executive officers cease all personal trading in
securities of the issuer that employs them, if that issuer is
98
experiencing a “blackout period.” A blackout period is a time of
at least three consecutive days when employees are prevented from
trading the issuer’s securities within their individual portfolio
99
accounts. The final provision, which requires attorneys who are
working for an issuer to report evidence of material violations of
100
Title III provides
securities laws, also only applies to issuers.
many examples of responsibilities under SOX that an ANC may
avoid by not taking actions to become an issuer.
2. Title IV: Enhanced Financial Disclosures. SOX devotes an
entire title to clarifying and intensifying financial disclosure
101
requirements. The most critical thing to note about this title is
that it is an amendment to Section 13 of the Securities Exchange
102
ANCs that have kept their exemption from the
Act of 1934.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are not affected by Title IV of
SOX.
A complete and exhaustive account of what is required of
issuers under Title IV would not be practical to pursue in this
analysis. Generally speaking, ANCs that are issuers must: disclose
103
off-balance sheet transactions; decline to give personal loans to
executives, unless those loans fall into a series of narrow
104
exceptions, as defined in SOX; disclose transactions which
involved either a holder of more than ten percent of any class of
the issuer’s securities, or a member of the management of the
105
issuer; abide by a code of ethics, as set by the SEC, for financial
106
officers; disclose whether or not there is a financial expert on the
audit committee, and if there is not, explain why there is not an

97. § 7243.
98. § 7244(a)(1).
99. § 7244(a)(4)(A).
100. § 7245(1).
101. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. IV (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
102. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j).
104. § 78m(k)(a).
105. § 78p(a)(1).
106. § 7264.
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expert;107 and finally, submit to an enhanced review of their
108
periodic financial disclosures and make immediate disclosures of
new financial information concerning a material change in the
109
financial condition of the company.
In sum, an ANC that becomes an issuer is exposed to a
barrage of new regulations. Those who are exempt under 43
U.S.C. § 1625 completely escape these new regulations, and are
free to continue operating as they have been in regard to financial
disclosures.
3. Title VIII: Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability.
From its first provision, Title VIII is different and more potent
than its counterparts. For example, it is not limited to “issuers,”
110
but rather “whoever” falls within its provisions. Its first provision
is that anyone who knowingly alters information relating to any
matter concerning a Title 11 bankruptcy may be fined or
111
This certainly affects ANCs to
imprisoned up to twenty years.
the extent that it may encourage employees and officers to abide
by bankruptcy laws, but it does not create any additional corporate
laws. Accordingly, it is unlikely to have any impact on the
operations of an ANC. Next, Title VIII provides sentencing
guidelines for individuals who destroy corporate audit records of
112
an issuer.
The second section is another that stands out as having a
potential effect on ANCs. It modifies Title 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code by making debts non-dischargeable if they are
113
What makes this
incurred in violation of a securities law.
important to all ANCs is that the violation that triggers this
114
provision can be a violation of any securities law, state or federal.
This means that an ANC may lose the ability to discharge some of
its debt if it violates statutes that affect all ANCs (for example,
115
state statutes that require disclosure to ANC shareholders). Most
importantly, this part of SOX applies whether or not the ANC is an
116
issuer.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

§ 7265.
§ 7266.
§ 78m(l).
18 U.S.C. § 1519.
Id.
§1520.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
Id.
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.433 (2004).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
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The somewhat subtle implications of this provision warrant
special attention. As will be shown later in this paper, 43 U.S.C. §
1625 requires ANCs to comply with the SOX provision that
obligates the principal executive officer to certify that the
117
Bearing that in mind,
company’s annual report is accurate.
suppose that a bank makes a loan to an ANC and relies upon its
annual report to determine that the company is creditworthy for
this particular loan. Suppose next that the company goes into
bankruptcy, and wishes to discharge all or a portion of that loan.
Suppose further that it is discovered that the annual report was
inaccurate.
It certainly seems possible that the officer’s
certification in this case was a violation of a securities law and that
the bank’s reliance on the annual report will make the loan nondischargeable. There may be room here for counter-arguments,
including that the violation was not “for” the loan, but this is
certainly a scenario of which ANCs should be aware and consider
118
carefully when they incur debts.
Title VIII also extends the statute of limitations for civil claims
119
This is only a procedural change,
involving corporate fraud.
120
Another
however, and does not modify any substantive law.
provision to protect whistleblowers similarly does not change
121
substantive law. It prevents corporate actors from discriminating
122
This
against employees who have disclosed evidence of fraud.
applies only to companies that have securities registered with the
SEC (which would only include ANCs who have either registered
securities other than Settlement Common Stock or those who have
voluntarily registered).
The last section of Title VIII creates criminal penalties for
123
It also
defrauding shareholders of publicly traded companies.
applies only to issuers and creates criminal penalties for anyone
who fraudulently obtains money or other property in connection
124
with the sale of securities.
Title VIII thus has significant impact on the management of
ANCs that may become issuers in the future. Executives of those
companies will be subject to increased criminal liability and are
117. See infra Part V.
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. III 2003) (extending the statute of limitations to
four years).
120. See id.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. III 2003).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1348.
124. Id.
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liable in civil suits for a longer period of time.125 As to non-issuers,
126
it creates criminal liability in the event of fraud and decreases
bankruptcy protections in cases where an ANC has violated
127
securities laws.
4. Title IX: White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements. Title
IX, a criminal provision, applies more universally than some other
SOX titles. In this regard, it is one of the stronger provisions. At
the same time, however, since it is a criminal code, it applies more
strongly to directors, officers, and other employees than to ANCs
themselves. Although business entities can be fined in a criminal
action, only individuals can be placed in jail.
Ideally, Title IX will not affect ANCs’ business at all (since all
affiliated people should obey the law). However, it may have a
chilling effect on some activities, particularly those which are close
to the line of being illegal, and in this way may affect ANCs’
business practices.
The first provision of Title IX penalizes attempts and
conspiracies to commit securities crimes just as much as if the
128
person had committed the crime himself. This could have a
significant impact on executives who previously may have been
more willing to go along with potential illegal practices, when that
individual was not at the heart of the illegal activity.
Next, Title IX dramatically increases the penalties for criminal
129
mail and wire fraud. The jail time for such violations is increased
130
Similarly, the penalties for violating
from five to twenty years.
the Employee Benefits Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
131
are substantially stiffened. SOX Title IX also calls for the United
States Sentencing Commission to make a large-scale review of
132
white-collar crime sentences.
Finally, it creates criminal sanctions for knowingly failing to
133
properly certify financial reports filed with the SEC. While this

125. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Supp. III 2003).
129. § 1341.
130. Id.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (Supp. III 2003) (raising fines of individuals to $100,000
maximum and fines of non-individuals to $500,000; raising jail penalties to ten
years.).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 994.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1350.
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technically applies to “whoever,”134 the practical effect of having
this penalty attached to SEC filings is that only executives at ANCs
who are also issuers are affected by this provision.
5. Title X: Corporate Tax Return. Title X is a unique SOX
135
provision because it does not provide for its own enforcement. It
merely says that it is the opinion of the Senate that the CEO of a
company should sign the federal income tax statement of that
136
This provision was not incorporated into the U.S.
company.
Code, but exists only within SOX itself. It does not appear that this
will affect ANCs in any official way, but, in light of this provision, it
would be a good idea for all ANCs to have their CEO sign any tax
information that goes to the federal government.
6. Title XI: Corporate Fraud Accountability. Title XI is a mix
of criminal penalties and enabling clauses designed to help curb
137
corporate fraud. It first creates criminal liability for anyone who
interferes with, or attempts to interfere with an “official
138
It goes on to give the SEC power to temporarily
proceeding.”
freeze payments to people under investigation for securities
139
However, this power only exists when the
violations.
140
investigation concerns an issuer.
Under SOX Title XI, the SEC has significant power to prevent
any person who has committed a securities violation from
141
becoming an officer or director of an issuer. The last provision is
a modification of the criminal code, which affects issuers and non142
issuers alike. It is essentially a whistleblower clause that punishes
employers for retaliation, “including interference with the lawful
employment or livelihood of any person” who has provided
143
truthful information to the SEC.
These provisions create some criminal liabilities for officers of
ANCs, but unless that ANC is an issuer, the corporations
themselves largely avoid the effects of Title XI. However,

134. § 1519.
135. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. X.
136. Id.
137. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. XI (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A)(i).
140. Id.
141. Id. (permitting the issuance of a temporary order).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e).
143. Id.
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directors of ANCs who might otherwise be tempted to commit
securities fraud, and then try to cover their tracks, may think again
in light of the provision regarding interference with official
proceedings.
C. The Collective Implications for ANCs
The preceding analysis shows that there are only eight
provisions of SOX that apply to ANCs that are not issuers: (i) Title
VIII criminal liability for anyone who knowingly alters information
144
relating to a bankruptcy; (ii) Title VIII’s provision which makes
certain debts non-dischargeable if they are incurred in violation of
145
(iii) Title VIII extension of the statute of
securities laws;
146
limitations for civil claims involving securities fraud; (iv) Title IX
provision making attempt and conspiracy to commit securities
147
crimes penalized the same as the underlying crime; (v) Title IX
148
(vi) Title X
increased penalties for mail and wire fraud;
declaration of Congress’s opinion that the CEO of a company
149
should sign all federal tax returns coming from the company;
(vii) Title XI criminal penalties for anyone who interferes with
150
official proceedings; and (viii) Title XI criminal sanctions that
protect corporate whistleblowers from being deprived of their
151
livelihood.
Six of these are criminal provisions that are primarily directed
at individual executives, and one of the remaining statutes is
merely an alteration to civil procedure and does not affect any
substantive law. That leaves only items number two and number
six from the list above. Furthermore, number six is a mere opinion
of Congress that does not come with any enforceability clause.
Therefore, it is only number two above—the SOX section that
makes debts non-dischargeable in bankruptcy if those debts were
152
incurred in violation of securities laws —that directly affects the
business of non-issuer ANCs. This provision only applies in
bankruptcy, and then only if debts were incurred illegally.
Consequently, ANCs which are not issuers avoid nearly all of the
force of SOX. There are no structural changes, disclosure changes,
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
§ 523(a)(19)(A)(i).
28 U.S.C. § 1658.
18 U.S.C. § 1349.
§§ 1341, 1343.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tit X.
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).
§ 1513(e).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(i) (Supp. III 2003).
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or securities practice changes that will affect non-issuer ANCs as a
direct result of SOX.
V. A LEGAL HOOK UNDER 43 U.S.C. § 1625
There is one more possibility for bringing ANCs under the
regulatory requirements of SOX. The same federal law that
exempts ANCs from the Securities Exchange Act also addresses
153
disclosure obligations. Specifically, it provides that
[a] Native Corporation that, but for this section, would be
subject to the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
[15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.] shall annually prepare and transmit to
its shareholders a report that contains substantially all the
information required to be included in an annual
report to
154
shareholders by a corporation subject to that Act.

There are two ways in which an ANC could become otherwise
subject to the Securities Exchange Act. First, if it has securities
155
listed on a national exchange and, second, if it has assets in excess
of $1,000,000 and also has equity securities held by 500 or more
156
people.
At present, no ANC has any securities listed on a national
exchange. However, many, if not all, ANCs have assets in excess of
157
158
$1,000,000 and more than 500 shareholders. Therefore, ANCs
are currently required to “prepare and transmit to its shareholders
a report that contains substantially all the information required to
be included in an annual report to shareholders by a corporation
159
Since SOX made amendments to the
subject to that Act.”
153. 43 U.S.C. § 1625.
154. § 1625(c)(1).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a).
156. See § 78l(g)(1)(B).
157. For example, Sealaska Native Corporation has over $276 million in assets.
Sealaska 2004 Annual Report, http://www.sealaska.com/2004AR/pdfs/200403_cbs.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). This raises a difficult valuation issue which
will not be analyzed here. Many ANCs own vast amounts of land, much of which
is very remote. The remoteness and relative seclusion of the land makes valuing it
very difficult. This could be the subject of a difficult dispute if the $1,000,000
threshold was ever a point of contention between an ANC and the SEC or a
shareholder.
158. For example, Calista Native Corporation originally had 13,303
shareholders.
Calista Corporation Business Enterprises, http://www.calista
corp.com/share1.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
While the number of
shareholders will fluctuate somewhat due to inheritances or gifting, the total
number of Calista, or any ANC shareholders, is very unlikely to ever drop below
500. Id.
159. 43 U.S.C. § 1625(c)(1) (2000).

03__MURPHY.DOC

284

1/10/2007 8:48 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[23:265

Securities Exchange Act, it thereby brings ANCs under some of its
requirements—or, at least “substantially” under those
requirements, but only insofar as SOX modified the annual report
160
requirement.
SOX makes changes to several annual reporting requirements.
It demands that the principal executive officer certify that the
161
annual report is accurate. It also requires the disclosure of off162
balance sheet transactions and that each annual report state the
163
One problematic
company’s structure of internal reporting.
requirement is for the disclosure of whether or not the audit
164
It is unclear
committee contains at least one financial expert.
how this rule could apply to ANCs, which are not required to have
165
an audit committee.
Though these changes will affect the annual reporting
requirements of ANCs, they escape SOX’s enhanced review of
166
those annual reports. Recall that though some provisions of SOX
are applied to ANCs via section 1625, ANCs are still outside the
jurisdiction of the SEC.
Section 1625, combined with SOX’s changes to existing
regulations, will affect some of the reporting requirements of
ANCs. However, it is only a sliver of SOX that makes its way
through. Furthermore, enforcement of those provisions is not
under the jurisdiction of the SEC, which is the body charged with
enforcing SOX. While these new requirements doubtlessly push
ANCs in the direction of more full disclosures to shareholders, they
represent only a fraction of the protections and regulations brought
upon ordinary corporations by SOX.
VI. CONSIDERATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT—ARE THESE
RESULTS ACCEPTABLE?
SOX was enacted in response to “those who have shaken
167
Its purpose was “to address the
confidence in our markets.”
systematic and structural weakness affecting our capital markets

160. Id.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
164. § 7265.
165. § 78j-1; see supra Part IV.B.1.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 7266.
167. George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks by President George W. Bush
at Signing of Corporate Accountability Bill (July 30, 2002), in FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE, INC., 2002.

03__MURPHY.DOC

2006]

1/10/2007 8:48 AM

SOX AND ANCS

285

which were revealed . . . in recent months and years.”168 The
paradigmatic example of these revelations were the financially
catastrophic events related to the fall of Enron and WorldCom,
both specifically mentioned by Congress in SOX’s legislative
169
history. The question, then, is whether ANCs have a significant
potential to cause the sort of damage that was caused by the
misdeeds of Enron and WorldCom.
The Senate report on the collapse of Enron first focuses on the
“shock waves” that Enron’s bankruptcy sent through the American
170
economy. Enron was the seventh largest company in the U.S. at
the time of its collapse, and its bankruptcy had broad effects on the
171
market. Of particular concern to the Senate was the fact that the
collapse affected, either directly or indirectly, the investments of
172
Furthermore, Enron
“over half” of American families.
shareholders realized huge losses on their investments, and those
Enron employees who had their retirement funds invested in
company stock saw devastating and life-changing losses with the
173
These were the core harms that
collapse of Enron’s stock.
Congress responded to when they enacted SOX.
The collapse of an ANC would not likely have a massive effect
174
on the national economy. While some ANCs are quite large,
they do not compare to the size and economic power of Enron.
Furthermore, an ANC collapse would have virtually no effect on
the stock market, because their securities are not traded on stock
175
It appears that this first concern of Congress is not
markets.
relevant in the case of ANCs.
Congress’s second core concern was for owners of Enron’s
stock, either through market investment or through retirement
accounts. An analysis of this factor in regard to ANCs shows some
clear distinctions.
First, ANC shareholders do not, in the
traditional sense, “invest” in the corporation. Instead, stock was

168. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 2 (2002).
169. Id. at 2, 29 n.59.
170. Id. at 1.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Afognak Native Corporation and its subsidiaries, for example, have offices
from Alaska to Hawaii to Florida. Alutiiq LLC, http://www.alutiiq.com/map.php
(last visited Sep. 10, 2006).
175. The Senate investigation did also recognize the cumulative effect on the
national economy of nonpayment of contracts associated with bankruptcies. S.
REP. NO. 107-70, at 1 (2001). However, this effect from an ANC bankruptcy is
likely to be relatively small, and not a threat to the national economy.
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distributed to them as part of a large-scale settlement with the U.S.
government.176 Second, since all current ANC stock is not
transferable, stockholders do not have an economic interest in the
market value of the share.
A collapse of an ANC would still be very harmful because it
would deprive shareholders of dividends on their settlement
common stock. Recall that the primary purpose of ANCs is to
177
A
distribute the benefits of the ANCSA to Alaska Natives.
collapse of an ANC due to poor accounting practices or financial
mismanagement would be a shameful failure of an ANC to reach
its goal. While Congress did not consider exactly this issue, it is
well within its goals and general intent to protect ANC
shareholders from losing the benefits of owning Settlement
Common Stock.
An argument may be raised that SOX-type protections are not
necessary for ANCs, because they have a deeper commitment to
their shareholders than a traditional corporation. Their history and
purpose is different than those of a traditional for-profit company.
Indeed, this is reflected in the missions of ANCs. For example, the
mission statement of Afognak Native Corporation provides that
the company’s governing body exists “to manage and protect
cultural resources, to manage and protect our land resources, to
reinvigorate Alutiiq identity and social structure, and to heal
178
divisions among the Alutiiq people.” The mission statements of
most, if not all, ANCs mirror these general goals. They all seek to
provide for Alaska Natives and take a holistic approach toward
achieving this goal. One may think that it is unlikely that an
organization which operates by those goals would ever engage in
the type of harmful activities addressed by SOX. Unfortunately,
history has shown otherwise.
The Cape Fox Corporation experienced financial
mismanagement in 1996 and 1997 when its Chairman of the Board
of Directors stole from the corporation, and managers took money
179
Personal
from the corporation in the form of personal loans.
180
loans to executives are exactly one of the findings from Enron
181
that Congress sought to address with SOX.

176. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g) (2000).
177. See § 1606(j).
178. Native Village of Afognak, http://www.afognak.org/governance.php (last
visited Sep. 10, 2006).
179. Martinez v. Cape Fox Corp., 113 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Alaska 2005).
180. S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 26 (2001).
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
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In 1990, the Kake Corporation made illegal and unauthorized
dividend payments to a select group of shareholders.182 The injured
shareholders in that case were eventually awarded damages, but
the misappropriation of dividends and the expense of the lawsuit
might have been avoided if there had been greater scrutiny and
transparency on the process by which Kake made financial
decisions.
Admittedly, these scandals were minor in comparison to the
massive downfalls of Enron and WorldCom. However, they are
just as important for the individual stockholders who were harmed,
and they show that ANCs have the potential to cause damages
similar to those that SOX sought to prevent. It would seem that
Congress made a mistake in allowing ANCs to slip through the nets
of SOX.
VII. LOOKING FORWARD: HOW ANCS SHOULD ADAPT
INTERNAL BEST PRACTICES TO SOX
By and large, ANCs avoid the requirements of SOX. This
means that shareholders of ANCs are not granted the protections
of that act. This is unfortunate because the type of protection that
SOX grants may be even more important to ANC shareholders
than to equity holders in ordinary companies.
It must be remembered that the primary purpose of ANCs is
183
to distribute benefits of the ANCSA to Alaska Natives. Because
of this, ANCs should take upon themselves a greater fiduciary
responsibility to their shareholders than an ordinary corporation.
The directors and management of ANCs should take steps above
and beyond what is required by the law to make sure that the
purpose of their corporations, to protect and expand the interests
of every holder of Settlement Common Stock, is fulfilled.
SOX, though not legally binding, should be used as a guideline
to protect the interests of ANC stockholders. Congress has taken
extensive time and energy to develop a system of protecting
shareholders from known dangers to their interests, dangers from
which ANCs are not immune. Managers and board members of
ANCs should take advantage of Congress’s work and implement
corporate guidelines, or “best practices,” which are identical to
SOX in every way that is relevant to the corporations they control.
For example, ANCs should have to create an audit committee
to oversee the auditing and accounting practices within their
companies. The cost of implementing these guidelines would not
182. Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Alaska 1997).
183. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(j) (2000).
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be insignificant, but would be cheap in comparison to the costs
associated with a corporate meltdown like Enron and WorldCom
experienced. Above all, the costs would be an investment in
protecting the interests of shareholders.
A final and substantial problem that ANCs may have in
implementing SOX-like guidelines is enforcement. Without a body
like the SEC overseeing and enforcing the best practices, the
guidelines would be enforced by the same people they are meant to
regulate. A prudent way of dealing with this problem would be to
have a stockholder-selected and fully independent compliance
committee. This committee would take exactly the same role as
the SEC has in SOX and would be vested with all the same powers
that are afforded the SEC under SOX. This group could even be
integrated with the audit committee mentioned previously. They
would be the watchdog for shareholders who would ensure that the
types of harms that were the catalyst for SOX litigation do not
befall ANCs and their shareholders.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An examination of SOX reveals that it will have a minimal
effect on ANCs which are not issuers. Currently, that means that
ANCs largely escape SOX. However, the fact that SOX does not
apply to ANCs does not mean that they are not capable of causing
the harms that SOX was meant to protect against. ANCs should
protect their stockholders by instituting internal best practices that
mirror SOX requirements. This would be a meaningful step
toward living up to the ANCs’ purpose. Internal governance
similar to SOX would help ensure that the benefits of ANCSA are
distributed to owners of Settlement Common Stock for years and
generations to come.

